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OPPORTUNITY COSTS: NONJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE AND THE SUBPRIME
MORTGAGE CRISIS IN GEORGIA
Barry Hester*
INTRODUCTION
By the fifteenth of the month, Mortgage Servicing Company has
not received a payment from Borrower, one of many Georgia
borrowers whose subprime residential mortgage loan it services.'
This is the third missed payment in as many months, and the two
previous late payments are still delinquent.2 Mortgage Servicing
purchased the rights to service this and many other loans from
Mortgage Trust, a subsidiary of an investment banking firm which
bought Borrower's loan from its originator and pooled it along with
hundreds more to form Mortgage Trust.
3
A Mortgage Servicing associate consults with Mortgage Trust and
draws up foreclosure materials after reviewing Borrower's loan
information on the MERS system.4 MERS is a national database
maintained by the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc., on
which "more than half of all home mortgage loans originated in the
[U.S.]" were registered by 2004. 5 Because Borrower's loan fits the
definition of a "high-cost home loan" under Georgia Code Section 7-
6A-2(7), 6 Mortgage Servicing sends Borrower a notice of default and
the right to cure within thirty days in order to avoid foreclosure
* J.D. 2009, Georgia State University College of Law.
1. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2044-45 (2007); Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory
Structured Finance, 28 CARDozo L. REV. 2185, 2210 (2007) (explaining that in corresponding with
customers, loan servicers "receive monthly payments, monitor collateral, and when necessary foreclose
on homes").
2. See Ohio Real Estate News, http://ohiorealestatenews.wordpress.com/category/foreclosure/ (last
visited Aug. 24, 2007) (suggesting that few lenders will foreclose until a borrower is more than two
months behind).
3. See Peterson, supra note I, at 2209.
4. See id. at 2211.
5. Id.
6. O.C.G.A. § 7-6A-2(7) (2007). See infra Part II.C.
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proceedings.7 Two weeks later, having heard nothing from Borrower,
Mortgage Servicing forwards notice of its intent to foreclose 8 and
drafts a notice of the foreclosure sale of Borrower's property to be
published in the local legal organ. 9 After two more weeks, Borrower
receives a copy of this notice,1° which Mortgage Servicing then
submits for publication in the Fulton County Daily Report for the
first of four required weeks."
Borrower contacts Mortgage Servicing at this time asking for
leniency. He does not contest the three delinquent payments but
requests additional time to come up with the money. The servicer
explains that she is not authorized to make major changes to loan
terms and instructs the borrower to call Mortgage Trust.' 2 Borrower
tries in vain to speak to someone at Mortgage Trust about amending
his loan.'
3
A month later, Mortgage Servicing conducts the foreclosure sale
on the steps of the Fulton County Courthouse 14 as an agent of MERS,
the mortgagee of record. 15 The servicer not surprisingly enters the
lone bid on the property.' 6 Three months later, Mortgage Trust
notifies Mortgage Servicing that the servicing contract for a new
mortgage on the property is available. Thus, roughly two months
after Borrower received notice of his third and final default, his home
was sold on the courthouse steps, and a new borrower is making
mortgage payments on and living in the residence within six months
of that default.
7. See O.C.G.A. § 7-6A-(5)(13)(C(ii) (2007).
8. See id. § 7-6A-(5)11.
9. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162 (2007).
10. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 (2007), amended by S.B. 531, 148th Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2008).
11. See O.C.G.A. § 9-13-141 (2007).
12. See Jeanne Sahadi, Subprime: Big Talk Little Help, CNN MONEY.COM, Sept. 26, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/09/26/realestate/few-loan-modifications/index.htm (asserting that loan
servicers may be restricted in the number of loans they can modify without getting the permission of
loan pool investors).
13. See id. (suggesting that lenders are not staffed to handle modification requests by borrowers).
14. O.C.G.A. § 9-13-160, 161 (2007).
15. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 2212.
16. See Basil H. Mattingly, The Shifi from Power to Process: A Functional Approach to Foreclosure
Law, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 78 n.7 (1996).
1206 [Vol. 25:4
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NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
This hypothetical illustrates the central tension in the law of
nonjudicial foreclosure: the viability of the current secured lending
model versus the protection of borrowers. 17 In many states, this
tension has taken on new policy dimensions in light of "predatory
lending" practices and foreclosure on subprime mortgages, those
loans offered to borrowers with the poorest credit scores. 19 This Note
considers whether Georgia's existing nonjudicial foreclosure law
sufficiently balances the individual and institutional interests at issue
in the subprime residential mortgage context. 20  Part I outlines
Georgia's experience in the current increase in subprime mortgage
foreclosure, its general nonjudicial foreclosure process, and the
traditional policy justifications for nonjudicial foreclosure. 2 Part II
examines recent changes to or prohibitions on nonjudicial foreclosure
in Georgia and elsewhere and extracts the policy motivations behind
those changes. 2 2 Part III explains that, while the factors giving rise to
the proliferation of subprime lending have probably weakened the
traditional policy defense of nonjudicial foreclosure and strengthened
its criticisms, other factors will likely dramatically reduce Georgia
borrowing opportunities in the near future.23 In this light, nonjudicial
foreclosure reform or prohibition is probably not warranted because it
17. Patrick B. Bauer, Judicial Foreclosure and Statutory Redemption: The Soundness of Iowa's
Traditional Preference for Protection over Credit, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1, 7 (1985).
18. Celeste M. Hammond, Predatory Lending-A Legal Definition and Update, 34 REAL EST. L.J.
176, 178-81 (2005) (asserting that there is no uniform definition of predatory loans but all describe costs
and terms that raise the costs of borrowing without adding any benefits, and discussing the many
practices associated with predatory lending, such as aggressive marketing, high and changing interest
rates, and prepayment penalties for paying the loan off early).
19. Id. at 176 (explaining that subprime borrowers typically have a FICO (Fair Isaac Co.) credit
score of less than 570); Dennis Hevesi, ABC's (andXYZ's) of Home Buying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003,
at 11 (suggesting that subprime loans are those available to borrowers with credit scores less than 620).
20. See infra Part III. Not all subprime loans are predatory, but the overlap between the two is
considerable. See Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The Growing Debt
Burdens of Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 44 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 178
(2007). As a result, Although this Note focuses on the sufficiency of nonjudicial foreclosure in the
context of subprime loans, predatory lending concerns are highly relevant.
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.
20091 1207
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continues to preserve borrowing opportunities in an uncertain lending
future.24
I. BACKGROUND
A. Subprime Lending, Securitization, and Foreclosure Rates in
Georgia
American residential foreclosure rates began a historic spike as
early as 2005 .25 The national rate of foreclosure in the first quarter of
262007 was the highest it has been in fifty years. In August, 2007, an
estimated 243,947 U.S. homes, or nearly one in 500, were subject to
foreclosure, public auction, or repossession.27 Estimates of Georgia's
foreclosure rates place it among the highest in the country.
28
Subprime mortgage foreclosure rates are particularly startling. 29 The
Center for Responsible Lending conducted a study of more than six
million subprime mortgages that were entered into between 1998 and
the third quarter of 2006; the results indicated that one in five of the
subprime mortgages made in 2005 and 2006 is likely to end in
foreclosure. 30 Significantly, subprime mortgages are estimated to
constitute one-quarter of today's mortgage market.31 Because of
scheduled "resets" in adjustable rate subprime mortgages originated
24. See infra Part HL.B.
25. David Gonzalez, Risky Loans Help Build Ghost Town of New Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2007, at B 1.
26. Dina ElBoghdady & Nancy Trejos, Foreclosure Rate Hits Historic High, WASH. POST, June 15,
2007, at Dl.
27. Vikas Bajaj, Foreclosures Surged 36% in August, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at
C3.
28. Carrie Teegardin, The Crisis of Foreclosure: A Sign of the Times, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 9,
2007, at Al (citing Mortgage Bankers Association report). But see Carrie Teegardin, Foreclosures: State
'Crisis' Figures Way Off, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 14, 2007, at Al (questioning a private company's
extreme projections of Georgia foreclosures).
29. ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSING GROUND:
FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS 3 (2006),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRL-foreclosure-rprt-1-8.pdf.
30. Id. at 2-3.
31. Ron Nixon, Study Predicts Foreclosurefor I in 5 Subprime Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2006,
at C4.
[Vol. 25:4
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NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
through 2007, the population of troubled subprime mortgages could
potentially rise throughout 2011.32
The increase in foreclosure rates on this type of loan reflects a
historic change in lending practices.33 Historically, lenders originated
and held the loan using their own money in what has been described
as the "two-party" period.34 After the Great Depression, the federal
government ushered in a "three-party" mortgage system by creating a
secondary mortgage market designed to protect borrowers by
underwriting loans.
35
In the last two decades, the "private-label securitization" model has
emerged as the predominant loan finance structure.36 Within this
framework, loans are bundled and sold to mortgage investment
vehicles, typically trusts, which increases the credit pool and spreads
lending risk from individual lenders to investors at-large. 37 This
change has increased the number of "credit-worthy" borrowers,
helping give rise to the modem subprime mortgage industry.38 The
system's underwriting, origination, and servicing mechanism can
engage ten or more parties.
39
B. Nonjudicial Foreclosure in Georgia Under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162
The speed of Georgia's nonjudicial foreclosure process has been
an easy target for blame throughout the recent increase in foreclosure
32. Valerie Cotsalas, Fear of Foreclosure, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 2007, at 11 (explaining that an
adjustable rate mortgage "resets" to a higher interest rate after a few years at an attractive introductory
rate); Real Estate News, Mortgage Reset Graph, Aug. 27, 2008,
http.//realestatenewsblog.blogspot.com/2008/08/mortgage-reset-graph-2008-2009-2010.html (last
visited Oct. 13, 2009).
33. Peterson, supra note 1, at2191.
34. Id. at 2194.
35. Id. at2194-96.
36. Id. at 2200.
37. Engel & McCoy, supra note 1, at 2041; Robert S. Friedman & Eric R. Wilson, The Legal Fallout
from the Subprime Crisis, 124 BANKING L.J. 420, 421 (2007); Peterson, supra note 1, at 2265.
38. See Kenneth C. Johnston et al., The Subprime Morass: Past, Present, and Future, 12 N.C.
BANKING INST. 125, 125-28 (2008).
39. Peterson, supra note 1, at 2265.
20091 1209
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40
rates. One Atlanta newspaper columnist explained that Georgia is a
state in which "the bank can grab your home without a court hearing
and before you have time to even realize what's happening" and
asserted that the practice must stop.4' In a recent case, even the
Georgia Court of Appeals weighed in:
In closing, we note that this litigation could well have been
prevented if Georgia law provided any kind of procedural
oversight-either judicial or administrative-for foreclosure
proceedings. The validity or invalidity of [the mortgagor's]
security interest in the Property should have been resolved as
part of the foreclosure proceedings, prior to the negotiation of
any settlement agreement. Unfortunately, our legislature has
declined to provide such procedural safeguards to homeowners
or to place any meaningful restrictions on mortgage lenders. In
light of the current mortgage crisis and high foreclosure rate
resulting from the practices of the subprime lending market, we
urge the General Assembly to address this important issue.42
Undoubtedly, the general Georgia nonjudicial process is one of the
most rapid means of foreclosure permitted in the nation, with
completion possible in less than two months after default.43 This
mechanism contrasts the year-long process in states like Florida,
where foreclosure is possible only through the court system.44 With
some exceptions, Georgia's process fairly exemplifies the typical
nonjudicial foreclosure remedy. 45 The system is one policy response
40. E.g., John F. Sugg, Let's Foreclose on the Gold Dome, CREATIVE LOAFING, Aug. 29, 2007, at
21.
41. Id.
42. Matrix Fin. Servs, Inc. v. Dean, 655 S.E.2d 290, 295 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
43. Jim Saccacio, The Best and Worst States for Buying Foreclosures, REALTY TRENDS, Mar. 2006,
http://www.realtytrac.com/news/customer/2006.3/index.asp.
44. Lisa Easterwood, Is Bankruptcy Reform Legislation Working, 17 PARTNERS IN COMMUNITY &
ECON. DEV. 2 (2007), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfm?objectid=19422D38-5056-
9F12-12E89D9C91AE28DB&method=displaybody.
45. FRANK S. ALEXANDER, GEORGIA REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND FORECLOSURE LAW § 8-2 (4th ed.
2007).
1210 [VoL 25:4
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NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
to the lender-borrower power struggle that is as old as secured
lending itself.
46
Georgia law makes nonjudicial foreclosure available to lenders
when a particular loan contract provides for it.47 For that reason, it is
also known as "power of sale" foreclosure, and the Georgia Supreme
Court has long enforced it as a contractual remedy subject to certain
statutory requirements. 4 8 Georgia Code Section 44-14-162 sets forth
the nonjudicial foreclosure mechanism for home loans not considered
"high-cost home loans."49 Upon default, the mortgagee intending to
foreclose is required to publish notice of the impending foreclosure
sale for four consecutive weeks in the local legal organ after sending
a copy of that notice to the debtor at least thirty days prior to the
proposed foreclosure sale.50 At any time before the foreclosure sale,
the borrower can redeem her interest in the property by curing the
default.51 The sale is conducted on the relevant county courthouse
steps on the first Tuesday of each month.52 In Georgia, the sale
price-although almost invariably below fair market value 53 -is not
subject to judicial confirmation unless the lender wishes to seek a
deficiency judgment.54 Lenders can seek a deficiency judgment
whenever the sale price is insufficient to cover the cost of the
borrower's debt.55 They rarely do so, however, because of the
difficulty in collecting from borrowers already unable to make
46. See Mattingly, supra note 16, at 89.
47. 3A GA. JUR. Property § 32:30 (2008).
48. Guff v. Guff, 32 S.E.2d 507, 507 (Ga. 1944); Salter v. Bank of Commerce, 6 S.E.2d 290, 293
(Ga. 1939). See generally 3A GA. JUR. Property § 32:30 (2008).
49. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162 (2007). For "high cost home loans," see discussion infra Part II.C. The
mechanism set forth in § 44-14-162 and those like it shall be referred to throughout this Note as
"general" methods of nonjudicial foreclosure as contrasted by those applicable only to certain loans.
50. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162 (2007); O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 (2007), amended by S.B. 531, 148th
Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2008).
51. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1438-39 (2004).
52. O.C.G.A. § 9-13-161 (2007).
53. Mattingly, supra note 16, at 96.
54. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(a) (2007); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 47, § 9-1.
55. ALEXANDER, supra note 45, § 9-1.
20091 1211
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mortgage payments. 56 Importantly, Georgia's general foreclosure
process does not provide the borrower with a statutory right of
redemption.57 This right, given to borrowers in several states, entitles
the borrower to redeem her interest in the property during a
statutorily-defined period after the foreclosure sale.
58
C. Traditional Policy Considerations Surrounding Nonjudicial
Foreclosure
Nonjudicial foreclosure is available to mortgagees in roughly sixty
percent of the states.59 All jurisdictions authorize judicial foreclosure
in some form.60 The primary reason advanced for permitting this
nonjudicial foreclosure is that it is a cheaper and more efficient
remedy.6' In addition to the savings afforded by not requiring court
proceedings, 62 proponents argue that the lender's rapid foreclosure
decreases the risk of incidental costs from "vandalism, fire loss,
depreciation, damage, and waste" associated with a property in
default.63 Nonjudicial foreclosure is an unquestionably quicker
process than its counterpart within the court system; in some states,
nonjudicial foreclosure can conclude in as few as twenty days. 64
Under several theories, nonjudicial foreclosure also supports the
borrower's interests. One economic perspective is that a rapid and
inexpensive means of foreclosure best serves the most fundamental
56. See John R. Dowd, Jr., Comment, Allowing Current Debtors to Retain Collateral Without
Reaffirming or Redeeming: A Healthy Balance Between Creditor and Debtor Rights, 17 Miss. C. L.
REV. 131, 147 (1996).
57. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 51, at 1465 n.252.
58. Id. at 1404.
59. See id at 1403.
60. Mattingly, supra note 16, at 93.
61. Debra P. Stark, Foreclosing on the American Dream: An Evaluation of State and Federal
Foreclosure Laws, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 229, 232 (1999).
62. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 51, at 1403.
63. Ira Waldman, Committee Member, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Prefatory Note on the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act (Aug. 2, 2002), http://www.abanet.org/
rppt/cmtes/rp/i4/waldman-UniformNonjudicialForeclosureAct.pdf.
64. Molly F. Jacobson-Greany, Setting Aside Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sales: Extending the Rule to
Cover Both Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud or Unfairness, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 139, 150-51
(2006); Stark, supra note 61, at 232 n.10.
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HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1212 2008-2009
1212  I SITY   ( L S  
 56 '   
  r   
 57   
  t t   
fmed period after the foreclosure sale.58 
. itional  siderations ding icial 
closure 
    
t  59 i ti s  i l  
   
i i l  
y.61  
,62 t  '   
 t  
ti ,    
 63 ti ly  
t r art  
 l  can conclude in as few as twenty days.64 
   
'   i    
i     
 "ent t rs  teral  
     ce itor  t r , ISS.  
v , . 
.   ,   , t  . . 
 . 
.  
t l , ra  
.  l closing  : tion l 
l sure ,  . . . ,  . 
 ,   . 
. Ir  l , itt  , ti l   i   i   
, t  t   t  i  j i i l   . , , . t. r l 
r tl t lr /i / ald an-Uniform_ j i i l_Foreclosur  _ Act.pdf. 
. ll  . J s - r , tti  si  j icial r l sure l s: t i  t  l  t  
 t  t i sic  t i i  ud  i ess,   . . , ~  ;  IO  
8
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/6
NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
element of secured lending: the use of collateral to minimize lender
risk.65 By lowering lender transaction costs associated with defaulting
borrowers, nonjudicial foreclosure arguably lowers mortgage costs
and increases opportunities to all borrowers.66 Others simply contend
that in many cases mortgage default is clear, and borrowers benefit
from the speedy release of their debt obligation.
67
From the borrower's perspective, judicial foreclosure may be
preferable because a mortgagee is given more time to redeem her
interest in the property or raise legal defenses to the foreclosure.
68
Nonjudicial foreclosures, on the other hand, have been described as
"harsh remedies because debtors lose their property in a proceeding
devoid of judicial oversight., 69 A consumer advocacy group has even
asserted that nonjudicial foreclosure should be declared an "unfair
and deceptive practice" in connection with loans governed by the
federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act.70 In cases where
federal or state government involvement is sufficient to implicate
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment protections, courts have held that
executions of nonjudicial foreclosure without personal notice or an
opportunity to present a defense violate borrowers' procedural due
process rights.71 Finally, critics suggest that the court supervision
inherent in a judicial foreclosure minimizes the likelihood of a
grossly inadequate sale price and resulting deficiency.
72
65. See DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS 126 (2004).
66. See id.; see also Waldman, supra note 63.
67. Id
68. Stark, supra note 61, at 232.
69. Jacobson-Greany, supra note 64, at 151.
70. Elizabeth Renuart, Staff Attorney, National Consumer Law Center, Testimony Before the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve Regarding Home Equity Lending and HOEPA (Aug. 4, 2000),
available at http://www.nclc.orginitiatives/predatory mortgage/hoepafl .shtml.
71. Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 410 F. Supp. 988, 989 (S.D. Ga. 1975) (holding that the federal
government's role in a mortgage financed by the Federal National Mortgage Association and subsidized
through the National Housing Act was sufficient to constitute state action under the Fifth Amendment's
due process clause); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250, 1256 (W.D. N.C. 1975) (finding state
action sufficient to justify Fourteenth Amendment due process protection in a clerk of court's filing of a
report validating a nonjudicial foreclosure sale).
72. John Mixon & Ira B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relieffor Foreclosed Homeowners: ULSIA Section
511(b), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 455, 480 (1992).
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II. RECENT MODIFICATIONS TO OR PROHIBITIONS ON NONJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE IN GEORGIA AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Recent Changes to and Prohibitions on Nonjudicial Foreclosure
in Other States Generally
In the last two decades, several state legislatures have added,
abolished, or significantly altered their general nonjudicial
foreclosure procedures. 73 These changes illustrate the continued
vitality of traditional policy debates surrounding this form of
foreclosure apart from new considerations implicated by subprime
lending.74 Illinois banned power of sale foreclosure altogether in
1987.75 This remedy had been an available contract term since
common law.76 On the balance, the change was described as an effort
by the legislature "to reduce the costs of foreclosure and to increase
the prices at which foreclosure sales occurred., 77
In 1998, the Hawaii legislature added a new form of nonjudicial
foreclosure combining elements of its existing judicial and
nonjudicial foreclosures. 78 The existing power of sale foreclosure
method had been in place since 1847 and was disfavored because of
its ambiguity while judicial foreclosures were criticized as taking a
year or more-a time during which rent and homeowner's
association maintenance fees did not have to be paid.79 Supporters
argued that improved nonjudicial foreclosure was warranted because
more than ninety-five percent of foreclosures went unchallenged.8 ° In
73. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1367.4(c) (West. Supp. 2005); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 657-5
(LexisNexis 2007); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1405 (West 2007).
74. See infra Part III.A.
75. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1405; Stark, supra note 61, at 233.
76. BRADLEY V. RITTER, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES IN ILLINOIS 481 (2006).
77. Catherine A. Gnatek, Note, The New Mortgage Foreclosure Law: Redemption and
Reinstatement, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 471,471 (1989); see also Mattingly, supra note 16, at 120 n.179.
78. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 657-5 (LexisNexis 2007); see also Sandi M. Skousen, New
Foreclosure Option Combines Best of Existing Processes, PAC. BUS. NEWS, June 12, 1998,
http://pacific.bizjoumals.com/pacific/stories/1998/06/15/story8.html; David C. Farmer, Hawaii Enacts
Expedited Nonjudicial Foreclosure, HAW. BUS. J., Nov. 1998, at 42.
79. Farmer, supra note 78, at 42.
80. Skousen, supra note 78.
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apparent response to these concerns, Hawaii Revised Statute Section
667 set forth clearer notice requirements relative to the existing
power of sale foreclosure mechanism, which was retained, and the
new "alternate" procedure was made available at the election of the
mortgagee.8' Its added clarity addressed the reluctance of title
insurance companies to insure the properties given the uncertain
finality of the sale.82 Significantly, pursuant to Hawaii Revised
Statute Section 667-35, the borrower, the foreclosing mortgagee, or
any other lienholder can compel a judicial foreclosure via court order
at any time before the foreclosure sale.83
Also in 1998, the New York legislature departed from sanctioning
only judicial means of foreclosure. 84 An amendment to New York
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law Section 231 made
nonjudicial foreclosure available for a narrow but significant purpose:
foreclosure upon commercial property. 85 This law did nothing to
modify the requirement that New York residential property be
foreclosed upon through the judicial system. 86 Moreover, in
permitting the commercial use of nonjudicial foreclosure, the New
York legislature prohibited its use in situations in which residential
tenants would be affected.87 It continues to ban them in connection
with residential property and enables commercial mortgagors to
compel judicial foreclosure upon proving "undue hardship." 88
California narrowed the availability of nonjudicial foreclosure in
2005 by significantly limiting its use by homeowners associations
81. Farmer, supra note 78, at 42.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 43.
84. Richard S. Fries, Amendment to RPAPL Article 14 Allows Nonjudicial Foreclosure of
Commercial Mortgages, N.Y. ST. Bus. J., Dec. 1998, at 50.
85. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1401 (McKinney 2007); Fries, supra note 84, at 50;
Foreclosure: New York Enacts Power of Sale Law, REAL EST. L. REP. (West Group), Nov. 1998, at 8
[hereinafter N. Y Foreclosure].
86. N.Y Foreclosure, supra note 85, at 8.
87. Id.
88. 2 MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY R. DWYER, & STEvEN W. BENDER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE
FINANCING § 19:3 (2007).
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seeking to collect unpaid dues by their members.89 Under enacted
Chapter 452, homeowners associations cannot use nonjudicial
foreclosure to foreclose on homes unless an individual homeowner
owes more than $1800 in assessments or owes assessments for more
than twelve months.90 In passing this law, legislators in committee
referred to a family that lost their home over outstanding association
dues of $1.50. 9 1 The statute also increased the notice required in
permissible applications of nonjudicial foreclosure by homeowners
associations.92 Amendments in 2005 to Wyoming's foreclosure law
also increased the notice requirements of that state's nonjudicial
foreclosure procedure.
93
B. Recent Changes to Nonjudicial Foreclosure Law in the Context of
Predatory Lending
1. A Model Act
Several states have recently included explicit prohibitions on the
use of nonjudicial foreclosure in predatory lending legislation, but its
use was not previously sanctioned in those states for any type of
loan.94 These seemingly redundant prohibitions are based on
provisions in the Home Loan Protection Act.95 This model act,
promulgated by the AARP in conjunction with the National
Consumer Law Center in 2001, has the stated purpose of "protecting
the homes and the equity of individual borrowers," and aspires to
address the persistence of abusive terms in home secured-loans. 96 The
Act sets forth general restrictions and prohibitions as well as special
89. Niki Zupanic, Keeping Homes off the Auction Block: California Limits Foreclosures by
Homeowners Associations, 37 MCGEORGE L. REv. 199, 199-200 (2006).
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1367.4(c) (West. Supp. 2005).
91. Zupanic, supra note 89, at 199-200 n.14.
92. Id. at 202.
93. Dale W. Cottam & Jack D. Edwards, Wyoming Foreclosure Law: Conforming to the Broad
Changes Made by House Bill 112, 6 WYO. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2006).
94. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26(k) (West 2007).
95. HOME LOAN PROTECTION ACT (Am. Ass'n of Retired Pers. 2001) [hereinafter HLPA].
96. Id.§l.
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restrictions on "high-cost home loans," defined as loans whose total
points and fees, interest rates, or prepayment penalties exceed certain
specified thresholds.
97
Among these special restrictions applicable to high-cost home
loans, Section 4(1) of the Act provides that creditors making a high-
cost home loan must use judicial foreclosure if it is available in the
state in which the secured property is located.98 For states that lack a
"full judicial foreclosure process," the Act proposes that such
creditors must "obtain a declaratory judgment in a court of competent
jurisdiction" that they have a legal right to foreclose before they can
exercise any available nonjudicial remedy.99 In the comments to this
proposed section, the drafters indicate that its provisions are
"intended to ensure that borrowers of high-cost loans will always
have an opportunity to raise any legal defenses they may have before
their homes are lost to foreclosure."'
100
2. Adoption of Legislation Based on the AARP Model Act
Various states have enacted anti-predatory lending laws since the
2001 promulgation of the AARP model act.1 1 Many of these lending
laws incorporate the model Act's definition of "high-cost home
loans" and place the same restrictions on mortgage terms and
practices. 0 2  Nonetheless, states that previously authorized
nonjudicial foreclosure and have enacted an anti-predatory lending
law using the structure of the AARP model act generally have not
included its prohibition on nonjudicial foreclosure for high-cost home
97. Id. § 2(e).
98. Id. § 4(l).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Julie R. Caggiano et al., Predatory Lending Law Developments and Assignee Liability Under
HOEPA and State Law, 62 Bus. LAW. 617,618-19 (2007).
102. See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 24-9-2-8, 24-9-5-3(a) (2006) (defining high cost home loans and placing
restrictions on them); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26 (2003) (restricting high cost home loans); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24 (West 2004) (defining high cost home loans); N.M. STAT. § 58-21A-6(E)
(2007) (restricting foreclosure on high cost home loans to judicial foreclosure proceedings); see also
Baher Azmy & David Reiss, Modeling a Response to Predatory Lending: The New Jersey Home
Ownership Security Act of2002, 35 RuTGERS L.J. 645, 650 (2004).
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loans. 103 A version of the Model Act's Section 4(1), for example, is
noticeably absent from an Arkansas version of the Act. 1°4 This is a
significant affirmation of a lender-friendly remedy in a lender-hostile
legislative climate.'0 5 Recent New Jersey, New Mexico, and Indiana
laws, on the other hand, expressly prohibit the use of nonjudicial
foreclosure using language materially identical to that in the AARP
model act even though such a foreclosure mechanism was not
otherwise available in those jurisdictions. 1 6
C. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Reconsidered in Georgia: GAFLA and
"High-Cost Home Loans"
The Georgia legislature was quick to pass its own version of the
AARP model act, and, as with versions of the Act enacted in other
nonjudicial foreclosure states, its adaptation stopped short of
prohibiting nonjudicial foreclosure for covered loans although it did
enhance the required notice. 10 7 Georgia's version, the Georgia Fair
Lending Act (GAFLA), was initially identified as among the toughest
lending laws in the nation, although subsequent amendments and
federal preemption may have limited its reach.'08  GAFLA
103. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-104 (West 2007).
104. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-104 (West 2007) with HLPA, supra note 97, § 4.
105. See generally, Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as
Laboratories of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295 (2005).
106. Compare IND. CODE § 24-9-5-3(a) (2006), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26(k) (West, 2003), and
N.M. STAT. § 58-2 1A-6(E) (2007) with HLPA, supra note 95, § 4.
107. Georgia Fair Lending Act, 2002 Georgia Laws Act 488 (H.B. 1361) (codified as amended at Ga.
Stat. § 7-6A-1 et seq.), amended by 2003 Georgia Laws Act I (S.B. 53); Leetra Harris & Brian Nichols,
Banking and Finance, Credit or Loan Discrimination; Define and Prohibit Abusive Home Loan
Practices; Provide for Prohibited Practices and Limitations for Covered Home Loans and High-Cost
Home Loans; Create Consumer Protections for Covered Home Loans and High-Cost Home Loans;
Provide for Penalties and Enforcement; Provide Exceptions for Unintended Violations; Provide for
Severability, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 14, 15 (2002).
108. Peterson, supra note 1, at 2243. The GAFLA was the subject of high-profile controversy in two
ways soon after its passage. First, the Office of Thrift Supervision of the Department of Treasury
announced that federal regulations preempted the GAFLA's restrictions on federally chartered banks
and their operating subsidiaries. Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream:
Predatory Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1339
(2006). Second, in response to the original GAFLA's broad provisions for assignee liability, rating
agencies such as Standard & Poor's indicated that they would no longer rate securities backed by
residential loans that originated in Georgia after the effective date of the statute. Id. at 1321. The rating
[Vol. 25:4
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incorporated the AARP Act's requirements and limitations on "high-
cost home loans" and defined those loans in the same way.10 9 The
GAFLA was an early showcase of the AARP Act's sweeping
regulation of abusive lending practices. 110 It instituted limits on
interest rates and marketing strategies and complete bans on
mortgage prepayment and modification penalties."' The law also
mandates pre-loan counseling and declares "unconscionable and
void" loan terms that specify a litigation forum unfavorable to the
borrower. 112 Notably, the law prohibits borrowers from bringing class
action lawsuits against lenders.
113
Despite its extensive regulation of substantive loan terms and
practices, the GAFLA made only two changes to the applicable
nonjudicial foreclosure process: it imposed new requirements that the
borrower receive notice of a right to cure the default at least thirty
days prior to the sale date as well as notice of the intent to foreclose
at least fourteen days prior to sale advertisement. 114 The model Act's
prohibition on nonjudicial foreclosure in connection with covered
loans was proposed but did not survive floor debate. 1 5 A
representative voicing opposition to the ban argued that requiring
"every foreclosure to go through the 'full court system"' would be
one of the GAFLA's "unintended consequences."" 6 Supporters,
meanwhile, later counted the ban's removal among the bill's
compromises. 117
agencies abandoned that position when the Georgia legislature quickly amended the statute to limit
assignee liability and create a due diligence "safe harbor." Id. at 1321-22.
109. O.C.G.A. § 7-6A-2 (2007); David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow
Predatory Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1032-33
(2006).
110. Peterson, supra note 1, at 2243.
111. O.C.G.A. § 7-6A-5 (2007).
112. Id. § 7-6A-5(6)-(7).
113. Id. § 7-6A-6.
114. Id. § 7-6A-5.
115. Harris & Nichols, supra note 107, at 37-38.
116. Id. at 37.
117. Id. at45.
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III. SUFFICIENCY OF NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE LAW IN
GEORGIA IN THE CONTEXT OF SUBPRIME LENDING
A. The Appropriate Lens for Examining the Sufficiency of Georgia 's
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Law in the Subprime Context
Examining the sufficiency of Georgia's nonjudicial foreclosure
remedy for subprime residential mortgages entails both traditional
and new policy considerations." 8 As previously stated, the central
tension in foreclosure law is the potential conflict between the
viability of the secured lending business venture and fairness to the
borrower. 119 Protecting the former ensures that lending institutions
remain profitable. 120 With respect to the latter, shelter and personal
well-being are potentially at stake. 121
Traditional foreclosure policy considerations continue to frame
contemporary foreclosure debate and reform. 122 Recent changes to
general nonjudicial foreclosure processes in Hawaii, New York,
California, and Wyoming ostensibly protect borrowers through
heightened notice. 123  In the same vein, New York's 1998
amendments authorize the use of nonjudicial foreclosure but not in
cases where the borrower can prove it causes "undue hardship.' 24
The New York amendments also limit the use of the new remedy to
commercial settings and, even then, essentially forbid its use in New
York City if more than sixty-five percent of the subject property is
used to house residential tenants. 125 Alternatively, the changes to the
general nonjudicial foreclosure process in Illinois and Hawaii, along
with its narrow amendment in California and Wyoming and its
118. See supra Part I.A.
119. See supra Introduction; see also Bauer, supra note 17, at 7.
120. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 65, at 126.
121. Anne Balcer Norton, Reaching the Glass Usury Ceiling: Why State Ceilings and Federal
Preemption Force Low-Income Borrowers into Subprime Mortgage Loans, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 215,
227 (2005).
122. See supra Parts I.C., ILA.
123. See supra Part B.A.
124. MADISON, DWYER, & BENDER, supra note 88, § 19:3.
125. See supra Part II.A.
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addition to the commercial lender's repertoire in New York, reflect a
continued policy focus on the lender's efficient remedy. 1
26
While these traditional policy concerns persist, potential changes
to Georgia's nonjudicial foreclosure remedy in the subprime lending
context should also be informed by a new set of considerations.
127
These include the highly securitized nature of subprime loans and the
special status of the subprime borrower. 128 Moreover, the GAFLA's
limitations on covered loan terms and practices are also relevant to
the question of whether nonjudicial foreclosure reform is an answer
to Georgia's mortgage foreclosure crisis.' 29 Finally, any potential
state-level changes to the subprime mortgage foreclosure remedy
must be evaluated in light of national responses to the subprime
mortgage crisis, including class action lawsuits, federal intervention,
and loan market backlash.
130
B. Examining Georgia's Nonjudicial Foreclosure Remedy for
Subprime Loans
1. The Effect of the Secured Lending Model on the Efficiency
Defense of Nonjudicial Foreclosure
The lender's interest in an efficient remedy continues to weigh
heavily on possible foreclosure reform but may be diminished in light
of securitization. 13 1 Georgia's existing nonjudicial foreclosure
process provides even lenders of high-cost home loans with an
undoubtedly potent remedy. 132 It preserves the lender's right to sell
the property within thirty days of sale advertisement as well as its
right to seek deficiency judgments. 133 On the surface, the ten or more
parties constituting the cast of characters that back various parts of
126. Id.
127. See infra Part HL.B.
128. See supra Part I.A.
129. See infra Part HI.B.
130. See infra Part llI.B.
131. Seesupra Part I.A.
132. Saccacio, supra note 43.
133. O.C.G.A. § 7-6A-5 (2007).
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the contemporary subprime loan seemingly reinforce the lender's
need for such an economizing process. 134 The compartmentalized
role of the various players, however, has streamlined the lender's
overall scheme. 135 Loan servicers, for example, only handle direct
interactions with borrowers and are insulated and supported by the
capital marshaled by third-party investment.' 36  Technological
advances such as the MERS database have directly reduced the
transaction costs of foreclosure.' 37 It has even been argued that
undercapitalized originators front the secured lending industry as a
"disposable filter," absorbing liabilities and expunging them through
bankruptcy or questionable settlement. 138 The proliferation of the
secured lending model is evidence of the viability of this arrangement
and its substantial deviation from the early mortgage models that
justified nonjudicial foreclosure. 39
On the other hand, the borrower's interest in an efficient
foreclosure mechanism is largely undiminished by securitization. 140
Again, decreased foreclosure costs theoretically lower borrowing
costs and increase borrowing opportunities. 14 1 To the extent that
subprime loans are more likely to end in default, all borrowers benefit
from a subprime lender's remedy that quickly puts foreclosed
properties back on the market. 14
2
134. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 2265.
135. Seeid.
136. Engel & McCoy, supra note 1, at 204 1.
137. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 2265.
138. Id. at 2273.
139. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 1, at 2041; Peterson, supra note 1, at 2273.
140. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 1, at 2041.
141. SCHMUDDE, supra note 65, at 126.
142. See id.
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2. The Effect of the Special Status of the Subprime Borrower on
the Fairness Critique of Nonjudicial Foreclosure
a. Considerations in the Nature of Due Process
Subprime borrowers probably have a heightened need for a fair
foreclosure proceeding. 143 Even when mortgage default is clear,
foreclosure law has historically acknowledged a borrower's interest
in a fair proceeding, judicial or otherwise. 144 Subprime borrowers are
vulnerable to the potentially cascading effects of foreclosure given
their weaker credit scores and fewer credit alternatives. 145 While this
may tip the balance in favor of enhanced protection for subprime
borrowers, some have argued that such borrowers are less responsible
about their loans and more brazen than other borrowers. 146 Others
point out that many subprime mortgages were issued to real estate
speculators investing in residential property. 147 The preemption issue
aside, it is also possible that subprime borrower protection, if
warranted, is granted by the restrictions on unfair loan terms
contained in the GAFLA. 148 Finally, subprime borrowers might not
deserve special protections for loans that would not otherwise be
available to them but for the lender's unconventionally risky
lending. 14
9
Fairness to the borrower can be measured by both legal and
practical standards. Although the GAFLA permits a relatively rapid
foreclosure process, it entitles borrowers to additional notice of the
right to cure and the intent to foreclose, it maintains general
nonjudicial foreclosure provisions for the right to notice of
143. See supra Part I.A.
144. See generally Mattingly, supra note 16.
145. Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due
Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 503, 571-72 (2002).
146. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1255, 1358 (2002) (positing that such buyers are more likely to use
the mortgage money for luxury items rather than for emergencies or repairs).
147. Vikas Bajaj, Builders and Homeowners Under Strain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2008, at CI.
148. The restrictions on unfair practices for high interest home loans arguably already provide
protections for subprime borrowers. See generally Harris & Nichols, supra note 107.
149. See supra Part I.A.
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foreclosure thirty days before the sale, the right to redeem the
property until the sale, and limitations on deficiency judgments. 150
The notice formula required by GAFLA for covered loans is
sufficient as a matter of law; the Georgia Supreme Court has held that
power of sale foreclosure does not involve "state action," the trigger
for due process protection under the Fifth Amendment. 151 In cases
where constitutional due process has been required, personal service
of foreclosure notice has been necessary.' 
52
As a practical matter, the borrower's interest in a fair foreclosure
proceeding probably extends beyond mere notice. 153 The foreclosure
process is a clear and compelling alteration of private property
interests. 154 In the residential property context, this alteration of
property interests affects a fundamental, non-economic human
concern: shelter. 155 Notably, the constitutional formulation of due
process includes both notice and the opportunity to be heard, and the
best indicia of the latter is the borrower's right to seek to enjoin
foreclosure. 1
56
b. The Borrower's Legal Recourse for Wrongful Nonjudicial
Foreclosure
The only legal recourse for borrowers in Georgia who believe they
are being subjected to wrongful nonjudicial foreclosure is a suit for
injunctive relief.157 A plaintiff has a cause of action in wrongful
foreclosure when there is a violation of the statutory duty to exercise
a power of sale fairly and in good faith. 158 In the secured lending
context, a plaintiff's need to resort to a wrongful foreclosure lawsuit
is partially a consequence of loan servicers' inability to modify
150. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.1-.2 (2007), amended by S.B. 531 (2008).
151. Parks v. Bank of N. Y., 614 S.E.2d 63, 64 (2005).
152. See ALEXANDER, supra note 45, § 8-2.
153. See generally Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
154. Id. at 313.
155. Norton, supra note 121, at 227.
156. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
157. See Waldman, supra note 63.
158. 3A. GA. JUR. Property § 32:36 (2008).
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terms. 1 9 Furthermore, Georgia borrowers are not entitled to a
statutory right of redemption even for loans covered by the
GAFLA. 160 This means they do not have the option of curing a loan
deficiency just one day after the foreclosure sale even if they then had
the money to do so.
161
In a suit to enjoin foreclosure, the increased number of parties with
a hand in a particular mortgage increases the plaintiff borrower's
costs because he must identify and serve a greater number of
defendants. 162 This assumes borrowers subject to foreclosure have the
time and resources to individually secure counsel-a questionable
assumption because borrowers would probably not be in default in
the first place if they could afford to sue for injunctive relief. 163 These
borrowers are especially harmed by the increased costs of litigating a
securitized loan.' 64
Moreover, the GAFLA specifically prohibits class action litigation
by borrowers whose complaint concerns a high-cost home loan. 165
The class action suit is generally intended to make a remedy available
to a large group of individuals with similar claims whose individual
losses are not practicable to litigate. 166 Although at least one
commentator has argued that foreclosure suits are not generally well-
suited to class action because the facts and claims tend to be highly
individualized, 167 borrower groups have already filed a number of
such lawsuits around the country.' 68 Thus, the GAFLA class action
ban may materially detract from subprime borrower protection. Many
subprime loan contracts make litigation considerations moot by
159. See Sahadi, supra note 12 (suggesting that lenders are not staffed to handle modification requests
by borrowers).
160. See supra Parts I.A, II.C.
161. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 5 1, at 1465 n.252.
162. Peterson, supra note 1, at 2265.
163. Id. at 2267-68.
164. Id.
165. O.C.G.A. § 7-6A-6 (2007).
166. Matthew Eisler, Note, Difficult, Duplicative and Wastefiul?: The NASD's Prohibition of Class
Action Arbitration in the Post-Bazzle Era, 28 CARDozo L. REv. 1891, 1905 (2007).
167. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 2268.
168. Faten Sabry & Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown: Not Again!, AM. BANKR. INST. J.
1, 45 (Sept. 2007).
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providing for mandatory arbitration, the fairness of which has been
questioned in this context.' 6 9 Additionally, reflecting the difficulty of
defensive litigation, defaulting borrowers have increasingly
responded to impending foreclosure by filing for bankruptcy.1
70
These considerations raise a more general question: Which party
should bear the burden of proof in a foreclosure proceeding? 17 1 If the
borrower is truly in default, it does not seem overly burdensome to
place the burden of proof on the foreclosing party. 172 On the other
hand, the mortgage debt is the borrower's obligation, and the
borrower may have better access to proof that a payment was made or
that the loan itself was not validly entered into.173 The burden of
proof question goes to the heart of foreclosure policy. 174 In isolation,
however, it is too narrow a consideration to be determinative of
nonjudicial foreclosure's sufficiency.175
2. Predatory Lending the Bathwater and Nonjudicial Foreclosure
the Baby: Alternative Remedies for Georgia's Foreclosure Crisis
The sufficiency of Georgia's nonjudicial foreclosure remedy in the
subprime context cannot be considered in a vacuum. Related
legislative, political, and economic variables may make hasty
changes to subprime foreclosure law short-sighted. 176 The GAFLA's
restrictions on lending terms and practices, if enforced, so
dramatically alter the balance between subprime lenders and
borrowers that it may more than address concerns over fairness, such
169. Peterson, supra note 1, at 2268--69.
170. Easterwood, supra note 44.
171. Stark, supra note 61, at 232 n.11.
172. See Harold L. Levine, A Day in the Life of a Residential Mortgage Tenant, 36 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 687, 694 (2003) (explaining that the burden of proof on a foreclosing party in a judicial foreclosure
"rapidly shifts to the defendant borrower").
173. See Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL
L. REv. 401, 467 (1993) (noting that the burden of proof is often imposed on the party with "better
access to evidence" related to the disputed matter).
174. Seegenerallyid.
175. See infra Part IIL.B.3.
176. See supra Part I.A.
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as the borrower's small chance of obtaining injunctive relief from
wrongful foreclosure. 1
77
Moreover, a backlash of class action litigation nationwide will
likely provide redress for current Georgia borrowers while raising
borrowing costs for future Georgia borrowers. 178 The effect of the
government's "bailout" initiative-the Troubled Asset Relief
Program-is still unclear.' 79 Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the
GAFLA will see greater enforcement in the wake of Cuomo v.
Clearing House Ass'n, a decision which calls into question federal
preemption of such state banking laws.1 80 In the short term, market
adjustments to the subprime lending industry will likely have a more
direct impact on the lender-borrower power struggle.' 8 1 Some predict
a return to the high down payment requirements and shorter mortgage
terms that traditionally made home mortgages unavailable to
subprime borrowers.1
82
The possible impacts of the GAFLA, the federal response, and
likely mortgage industry backlash are probably not yet being felt by
current borrowers because most of the loans currently triggering
foreclosure originated before the current awareness of abuses in
predatory lending developed. 183 Thus, while securitization has
probably weakened the traditional efficiency justification for and
strengthened the traditional borrower fairness criticism of nonjudicial
foreclosure, related influences will almost certainly reduce borrowing
opportunities in the near future. 184 These influences will probably
also provide additional borrower safeguards particular to subprime
lending. 185 The 2008 Georgia General Assembly, for example,
177. See supra Part ilI.C.
178. See generally Friedman & Wilson, supra note 37.
179. Floyd Norris, U.S. Bank Bailout to Rely in Part on Private Money, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9. 2009, at
Al.
180. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
181. Mark Trumbull, Home-loan Trouble Spurs Fears of U.S. 'Credit Crunch,' CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Mar. 15, 2007, at 2.
182. Id.
183. Cotsalas, supra note 32, at 11.
184. See supra Part I.A.
185. See supra Part ll.B-C.
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increased the generally applicable requirement for notice of
foreclosure proceedings upon a residence under any power of sale
arrangement from fifteen to thirty days.8 6 In this light, nonjudicial
foreclosure might well continue to insulate the lender from the risks
of lending without unreasonably harming the subprime borrower.' 
87
CONCLUSION
Securitization has facilitated the proliferation of subprime lending,
and, in turn, the dramatic increases in U.S. foreclosure rates during
the last three years.' 88 At the same time, this new lending
infrastructure has probably weakened the traditional efficiency
defense of nonjudicial foreclosure while bolstering the borrower
fairness argument against it. 189 Nonetheless, nonjudicial foreclosure
is a stronghold for borrowing opportunities as legislative, political,
and economic forces will likely constrain them in the near future.
190
The GAFLA, if rigorously enforced, has the potential to reduce the
number of borrowers whose interests are poorly served by Georgia's
swift nonjudicial foreclosure and the limited legal recourse that
process provides. 191 This law is in fact a means of preventing the
likeliest long-term cause of the current foreclosure increases: abusive
lending. 192 For these reasons, reform or prohibition of nonjudicial
foreclosure should probably not be viewed as a remedy for Georgia's
current incidence of subprime mortgage foreclosure. 193  This
mechanism is more accurately understood as an important structural
support for the secured loan that insulates lenders from the risks of
186. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2, amended by S.B. 531. S.B. 465, which would have extended that
notice period to 90 days for § 7-6A-2(7) "high cost home loans," failed.
187. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 65, at 126.
188. See supra Part LA.
189. See supra Part Ill.
190. See supra Part IlI.
191. Seesupra Part Bl.C.
192. See supra Part B.C
193. See supra Part [l.B.
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subprime lending by spreading some of the risk back onto the
borrower. 1
94
194. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 65, at 126.
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